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THE TENSION BETWEEN TEXTUALISM AND
SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM DOCTRINES IN TAX LAW
Allen D. Madison*
All judges follow a simple rule: when the statute is clear, ap-
ply it. But people rarely come to court with clear cases. Why
waste time and money?
-Judge Frank Easterbrook,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit1
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotation from Judge Easterbrook illustrates
how the law works when the parties can rely on the text of a
statute. In tax law, such reliance is often not available. While
the Supreme Court has been taking a more textualist approach
to interpreting statutes2-i.e., applying the clear text of a stat-
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tenboer, David L. Forst, Andrew J. Kim, and Robert T. Winant for informal discus-
sions on the issues addressed; Trudie S. Williamson for administrative support and
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cellent library support; and Charleen H. Rubin and AnjaLee Nix for their reality
voidance and other abstract support.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61L61 (1994).
2. According to a former judge of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
"true believers" in textualism include Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Ken-
nedy, with Justices William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Byron White
becoming more supportive of the textualist approach. See Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89
Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 300 (1990). Since that
article, Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer have joined the Court, and
Justice Byron White has departed. Other commentators have also noted Justice An-
tonin Scalia's influence. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS-THE RISE,
FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 311 (1999) (noting that Justice
Anthony Kennedy is a self-proclaimed textualist); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme
700 SANTA CLARA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 43
ute3 - the current state of tax law in the lower courts is distinc-
tively non-textualist. The approach the lower courts take to tax
cases can be described as non-textualist because it permits courts
to ignore or override the text of a statute, in certain instances, by
applying judicially-developed doctrines that incorporate sub-
stance-over-form principles. Judge Learned Hand introduced
these substance-over-form principles into tax law in 1934 in
Helvering v. Gregory.4 In Gregory, Judge Hand held that a tax-
payer who has jumped through the textual hoops in the Internal
Revenue Code is not necessarily entitled to the tax benefit the
text of the Code provides if the transaction or activities of the
taxpayer appear questionable. 5
Textualism and substance-over-form as applied in tax law
are polar opposites.6 Under textualism, statutes should be inter-
Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique,
36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999); Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Inter-
pretation: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 592-94 (1996)
(noting less reliance on non-textual sources between 1981 and 1995); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1597, 1598 n.9 (1991) (noting that Justice Anthony Kennedy has supported textual-
ism in Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 PG (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
3. See, e.g., Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001); United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
4. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
Many courts and commentators attribute the genesis of the substance-over-form
doctrines to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gregory, which affirmed Judge Hand's
opinion. See Horn v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The initial and
seminal case for the sham transaction doctrine is Gregory v. Helvering .... ); Alex-
andra M. Walsh, Note, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, Practi-
cal Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1554 (2001); Karen Nelson
Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to
Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FL. L. REV. 659, 660 (1989) ("Modern sham transaction
jurisprudence draws heavily from three Supreme Court cases, decided over a forty-
three-year period, beginning with Gregory v. Helvering in 1935."). Another commen-
tator has noted that Judge Hand wrestled with substance-over-form issues as early
as 1918 in United States v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211
(2d Cir. 1918). See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the
Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968).
5. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 809-11.
6. The tension might be accurately described as Justice Scalia does in Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), while he is criticizing the
majority:
To acknowledge that "there perhaps is an inherent tension" between this
line of cases and the line stemming from Furman ... is rather like saying
that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis
Powers in World War 11. And to refer to the two lines as pursuing "twin
objectives" ... is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and
evil. They cannot be reconciled.
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preted on the basis of what the text means.7 Under the sub-
stance-over-form doctrines, courts are permitted to ignore or
disregard the text of the Internal Revenue Code on the basis of
economic principles or taxpayer motivation or both.8
Some commentators have suggested that Justice Scalia has
brought about a trend in the Supreme Court in favor of textual-
ism. The Supreme Court has not decided a case on substance-
over-form grounds since the appointment of Justice Scalia in
1986. If the Court hears a tax case involving substance-over-
form while Justice Scalia remains on the Court,9 it will be inter-
esting to see if the approach of the lower courts will survive tex-
tualist scrutiny. The last case the Supreme Court decided a case
involving substance-over-form was Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States in 1978.10 One case the Supreme Court decided after 1986,
Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, had substance-over-form
issues, but the Court did not decide the case on that basis." Both
of the lower courts that issued opinions in Cottage Savings - the
Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals -decided the
case on the economic substance doctrine, which arose from
Gregory's progeny. 12 The Supreme Court's opinion, however,
sidestepped the issue.13 Another case the Court decided since
1986 mentions one of the substance-over-form doctrines, but
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). See also Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualisin, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998).
See generally Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [here-
inafter Scalia, Role of Federal Courts]; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law].
8. See discussion infra Part 111.
9. See Jeffrey Birnbaum, Is Justice Antonin Scalia Frustrated Enough to Retire in
2001 ?, FORTUNE, Nov. 22, 1999, at 80.
10. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
11. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
12. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499
U.S. 554 (1991); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 372 (1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848
(6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). The economic substance doctrine is a sub-
set of substance-over-form principles.
13. Although the Court mentioned a substance-over-form doctrine, the Court
dismissed it on the basis of bad lawyering. The Court stated:
The Commissioner contends that the losses were not sustained because
they lacked "economic substance," by which the Commissioner seems to
mean that the losses were not bona fide. We say "seems" because the
Commissioner states the position in one sentence in a footnote in his brief
without offering further explanation.
Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 567-68.
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does not treat the doctrine as more important than the statute's
text.14 There have been other opportunities for the Court to ad-
dress the tension between textualism and substance-over-form
since Justice Scalia's arrival, but the Court has chosen not to do
SO.15
This article first discusses textualism 16 and the standard
substance-over-form doctrines applied in tax cases, 17 and then
analyzes the tension between the two. 18 This analysis examines
developments in the Supreme Court, congressional action re-
garding the Internal Revenue Code, and activities of the tax pol-
icy and tax enforcement agencies. The article concludes from
this analysis that the substance-over-form doctrines discussed
here are no longer appropriate in tax cases. 19
II. TEXTUALISM
There are two basic viewpoints as to how courts should in-
terpret statutes: textualist and non-textualist.20 According to
Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., some textualists believe that a
judge should interpret a statute by examining "the text, the
whole text, and nothing but the text."21 Under this theory, a tex-
tualist searches for the meaning of the words used in a statute.22
14. See Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989) (integrating steps of a transaction
on the basis of the structure of the applicable Code provisions).
15. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing the sham transaction doctrine), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002); Del Com-
mercial Props. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the step-
transaction doctrine), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002); ASA Investerings P'ship v.
Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing the sham transaction doc-
trine), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.
1998) (discussing the sham transaction doctrine), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999);
Herrington v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the sham transaction
doctrine), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989); Gardner v. Comm'r, 954 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing the sham transaction doctrine), cert. denied sub nom. Falk v.
Comm'r, 504 U.S. 910 (1992); Cook v. Comm'r, 941 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1991) (discuss-
ing the sham transaction doctrine), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991); Lerman v.
Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing the sham transaction doctrine), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 984 (1991).
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infa Part V.
20. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 23. Some commentators
further subdivide the non-textualists, but those subdivisions have no relevance to
this discussion.
21. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1514.
22. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 16.
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The basis for textualist interpretation rests on a theory of separa-
tion of powers inherent in American democracy. 23 The legisla-
ture enacts the laws, the executive branch enforces the laws, and
the courts interpret the laws.24 Thus, the argument goes that the
text of a statute enacted pursuant to the bicameralism and pre-
sentment clauses of Article I of the Constitution controls, 25 not
the unstated intent of Congress.
In contrast, non-textualists attempt to give effect to the leg-
islature's intent by looking beyond the text of the statute for evi-
dence of that intent.26 From a practical standpoint, textualists
point out that legislatures have no collective intent.27 Each of the
chambers of Congress, and specifically, each of the members in
each chamber, may have had different reasons for wanting cer-
tain words in the statute, but it is only the words that both
chambers passed, and the President signed, that became law.28
A. Justice Scalia's Textualism
Justice Scalia has not hidden his views on judicial interpre-
tation of statutes. He has published various works discussing
his philosophies. 29 He has set forth the foundations for a textual-
ist approach, given justifications for a textualist approach, and
criticized other approaches.3 0 If one read only Justice Scalia's
writings on statutory interpretation, one would wonder what
other approaches could possibly exist. His approach has an at-
tractive logic to it that gives it great force and persuasive power.
23. See id. at 9.
24. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1-II; O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
The Court stated:
The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates three
distinct and separate departments -the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience or of gov-
ernmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital .... [Nlamely, [its ob-
ject is] to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of
government in the same hands.
Id.
25. See Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cls. 2-3.
26. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 16-18.
27. See William Robert Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1965); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 863 (1930).
28. See Bishin, supra note 27, at 14; Radin, supra note 27.
29. See generally Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7; Antonin Scalia, As-
sorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (1990)
[hereinafter Scalia, Canards]; Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7.
30. See generally Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7.
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1. Foundations
Although Justice Scalia sets forth democracy as the founda-
tion and justification for textualism, it appears that the founda-
tion for his own views rests in part on the modern reliance of
federal courts on statutes rather than on common law.31 Judges
developed the common law piecemeal, case-by-case, according
to what the judge in the particular case thought was appropriate
for the set of facts before it.32 This approach is no longer appro-
priate where statutes have, for the most part, replaced the com-
mon law.33 The law as developed under statutes should not
develop piecemeal according to the whims of the judiciary. 34
Even vague statutes should not give rise to a "facts and circum-
stances" test.35 According to Justice Scalia, abandoning the
common law in favor of clear rules restrains judicial biases and
provides predictable and legitimate rules of law.36
31. See id. (laying the groundwork for Justice Scalia's textualist discussion by
noting that "in the federal courts, where, with a qualification so small it does not
bear mentioning, there is no such thing as common law" and that "[e]very issue of
law resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of text-the text of a regula-
tion, or a statute, or of the Constitution"). See also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)
(holding that federal courts should only apply state statutes and not the common
law as developed in each state); 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 1.03 (5th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002) ("[Slociety has placed progres-
sively greater reliance on legislative bodies and attempted to withdraw from the
courts more of the function of determining the character of society and the princi-
ples under which individuals must live."). Other commentators have concluded
that Justice Scalia rests his views somewhat on the need for clear rules as a way of
restraining judges. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1619 ("[Justice Scalia's] textualism in
statutory interpretation as a means of restraining judges is but a part of his repeated
calls for clear, bright-line rules to cabin judicial discretion."); see also William D.
Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1186 (1992) ("[Justice Scalia's textualist] position rests... on
conceptions of legitimacy, in the normative sense of the rule of law .. "). Like the
chicken and the egg, it is difficult to tell if Justice Scalia adheres to text because he
believes a common law approach is inappropriate, or if he eschews common law
methodology because he believes in the virtues of textualism. Regardless, the two
ideas are interrelated.
32. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 3-9; Scalia, Rule of Law,
supra note 7.
33. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 13.
34. See id.
35. The "facts and circumstances" test is an approach to deciding cases that
embraces traditional common-law principles where courts take into account the to-
tality of the circumstances to decide the outcome of a case rather than relying exclu-
sively on the strict wording of a particular statute. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra
note 7, at 1180-81 (describing the "facts and circumstances" test, although labeling
the test as a "totality of the circumstances" test).
36. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 1180; see also Alex Kozinski, My
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In the case of a vague statute, Justice Scalia has articulated
that an appellate court should craft a general rule rather than
decide cases under a "facts and circumstances" test.37 The appli-
cation of a "facts and circumstances" test by an appellate court
becomes a fact-finding exercise by that court, which is not the
appellate court's role.38 A "facts and circumstances" test is in-
appropriate unless so provided by the statute, as in the Voting
Rights Act.39 Even cases involving the Sherman Act, a vague an-
titrust statute,40 are not decided on a case-by-case basis.41
Rather, courts have applied clear rules anchored in the Sherman
Act's text.42
Justice Scalia does not discuss whether a judge sitting as a
trier of fact, as do judges for tax cases in the Tax Court and
Court of Federal Claims, should apply a "facts and circum-
stances" test. It seems that they should not, however. In the ab-
stract, the judicial application of a "facts and circumstances" test,
in which the application of a statute's text resolves an issue,
seems to obviate the statute.
Justice Scalia finds support for his textualist approach in
American democracy. 43 He writes that the common-law ap-
Pizza with Nin6, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583, 1589 (1991). Justice Scalia expressed this
concern in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, in which he urged the Court to
reconsider Roe v. Wade:
We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail
from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us-their un-
elected and lifetenured judges who have been awarded those extraordi-
nary, undemocratic characteristics precisely in order that we might follow
the law despite the popular will- to follow the popular will.
Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 1180-81 (discussing a totality of the
circumstances test).
38. See id. at 1182.
39. See id. at 1183; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982) ("A violation of subsection
(a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the po-
litical processes leading to nomination or election.., are not equally open to par-
ticipation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) .... ").
Another recent example in tax law is in the regulations under I.R.C. § 355(e) (2002),
which have adopted an explicit "facts and circumstances" test in determining the
existence of agreements, understandings, and arrangements. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-
7T(h)(1)(i) (2002).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002) ("Every contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade... is declared to be illegal.").
41. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 1183.
42. See id.
43. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 10. Justice Scalia discusses
democracy as it relates to statutory construction. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486
U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The prin-
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proach "would be an unqualified good, were it not for a trend in
government that has developed in recent centuries, called de-
mocracy." 44 Under the separation of powers doctrine inherent in
American democracy, Congress enacts the laws and the courts
interpret the laws in light of Congress' expressed intent.45 It is
not the subjective or actual intent that interpreters look for, but
an "objectified" intent.46 This objectified intent is the law of the
land. Under this approach, it does not make sense and it is not
fair to inquire into what was intended rather than what was en-
acted.47 It is respect for the enacted text that makes America "a
government of laws, not of men."48 When a judge inquires into
the actual intent of the legislature, she is left with deciding what
the law ought to mean instead of what the text actually means.49
ciple of our democratic system is not that each legislature enacts a purpose, inde-
pendent of the language in a statute, which the courts must then perpetuate, assur-
ing that it is fully achieved but never overshot by expanding or ignoring the
statutory language as changing circumstances require.").
44. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 9.
45. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (discussing the separa-
tion of powers); Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 16-18 (discussing leg-
islative intent).
46. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 17. Justice Scalia also makes
this point in his concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Machinery Co., 490 U.S. 504,
528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), in which he states:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on
the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a
larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and
thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which
voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it),
and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction,
we assume Congress always has in mind.
Id. at 528.
47. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 16-17 ("Why not accept, as
proper material for the court to consider. . . , a sworn affidavit signed by the major-
ity of the each house, for example, as to what they really meant.").
48. Id. at 17. Justice Scalia writes further, "men may intend what they will; but
it is only the laws that they enact that bind us." Id. Justice Scalia criticizes the ma-
jority opinion in Morrison v. Olson for eschewing the text of the Constitution in fa-
vor of resort to a common law approach. There he stated:
Evidently, the governing standard is to be what might be called the unfet-
tered wisdom of a majority of this Court, revealed to an obedient people
on a case-by-case basis. This is not only not the government of laws that
the Constitution established; it is not a government of laws at all.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712 (1988).
49. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 18 ("When you are told to decide,
not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant, and
are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best shot at
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This inquiry was appropriate in common-law times, when the
law developed one case at a time and judges decided what the
law should be.50 Now, however, the authority to decide what
the law should be resides in the purview of Congress.51 Con-
gress has the authority to consider the broad implications of
statutes it enacts and the authority to change the laws with the
changing world,52 not the judiciary.53
2. Method
Justice Scalia has identified principles that he claims to fol-
low in deciding cases. He notes that he is not a strict construc-
tionist, and he is not a lenient constructionist. 54 Rather, he
believes statutes should receive a reasonable interpretation.55 A
reasonable construction of a statute, however, does not permit
words to be interpreted outside of their limited range of mean-
ings.56 His practice of deferring to the ordinary meaning of the
words of a statute appears consistent with the claim that he is a
reasonable constructionist.5 7 In Chisom v. Roemer, he even cited
Webster's Dictionary to show that the word "representatives"
figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelli-
gent person should have meant; and it will surely bring you to the conclusion that
the law means what you think it ought to mean-which is precisely how decide
things under the common law."). See also Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1619 ("Once text is
abandoned, answers to statutory cases are not found in the 'law' but the judge's
own views of justice, fairness, or social welfare") (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
50. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 1183.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
52. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 136. One of Justice Scalia's
points is that judges are not elected by popular vote. Many commentators agree on
the basis that judges have not accepted the responsibility to follow the wishes of the
people. See Cornelius J. Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOwA L. REV. 1, 31-
45 (1983); Michael J. Dittoe, Statutory Revision by Common Law Courts and the Nature
of Legislative Decision Making -A Response to Professor Calabresi, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J.
235 (1984); Ernst Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 U. ILL. L. REV. 364
(1918).
53. Other commentators discussing textualism have quoted a Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes statement embodying these principles. When commenting on a
statute he disagreed with, Justice Holmes stated: "[I]f my fellow citizens want to go
to Hell I will help them. It's my job." See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 407 (1989) (quoting 1 OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 249 (Mark DeWulfe Howe ed., 1953)).
54. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 23.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 24.
57. See id. at 23.
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does not refer to judges.58
Commentators have criticized Justice Scalia's use of diction-
aries. For example, Professor Nicholas S. Zeppos 59 believes that
it is more realistic to speculate as to the collective intent of Con-
gress than "to assume that Congress enacts statutes with the care
of a lexicographer."60 It does not seem that Professor Zeppos'
criticism considers the public that must live by the laws Con-
gress enacts. Statutes communicate Congress' will to the public,
and judges preside over any controversy that arises.61 The law
assumes that the public understands the words Congress uses.62
It makes sense for courts to expect the same from Congress as
they do from those governed by its laws.
Justice Scalia acknowledges that it is permissible for judges
to take into account "scrivener's error" when interpreting a stat-
ute. This view appears to fit within his theoretical parameters
because he views it as a "mistake of expression" rather than a
mistake of "legislative wisdom."63 As an example of sound use
of context to make sense of scrivener's error, Justice Scalia de-
scribes a statute that uses the word "defendant" when it is clear
that the statute refers to a "criminal defendant" rather than a
"civil defendant."64
Justice Scalia agrees with his critics that textualism is for-
malistic rather than pragmatic. 65 It separates the law from its
underlying policies.66 His response to this objection to separa-
tion is the following: "[Olf course it's formalistic! The rule of law
is about form."67
With respect to canons of and presumptions for statutory
construction, Justice Scalia is vague about canons but opposes
58. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Professor Zeppos was one of numerous participants in a symposium dis-
cussing Justice Scalia's methodology. See Zeppos, supra note 2.
60. Id. at 1619.
61. See SINGER, supra note 31, § 1.03 ("The statute is merely a structural device
through which the determined principle is communicated for the regulation of pri-
vate conduct and for the limitation of governmental activity.").
62. It is unlikely that a judge would have sympathy for a criminal defendant
that thought what he did was legal because he did not understand a word used in a
statute.
63. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 20.
64. See id. This issue arose in Green v. Bock Laundry Machinery Co., 490 U.S. 504
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 25.
66. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1623.
67. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 25.
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presumptions.68 He describes true canons of construction as
common sense and beyond criticism, aside from the fact that
they are often expressed in Latin.69 The use of canons of con-
struction, he acknowledges, has its limits. 70 According to Justice
Scalia, they are merely evidence of meaning, and thus not con-
clusive. 71 One interpretation is that he might believe that resort
to canons for interpretation is better than resort to common law
or legislative history. Common-law presumptions, on the other
hand, "are a lot of trouble."72 Justice Scalia thinks that instead of
clarifying the language of a statute, presumptions add vague-
ness.73 For example, consider the presumption that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be read narrowly. 74 How
narrowly are they to be read?75 This inquiry produces no clear
answer.
Although Justice Scalia believes that the text of a statute
should be followed, he also believes in stare decisis.76 He has
difficulty finding a textual basis for certain rights that are en-
grained in American law, such as some First Amendment
rights.77 But the Supreme Court "has developed long-standing
and well-accepted principles.., that are effectively irreversi-
ble." 78 On the other hand, Justice Scalia recognizes that, in some
cases, the legal system may be better served by the reversal of
bad precedent. 79
68. See id. at 25-27.
69. See id. at 25.
70. See id. at 27.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 28.
73. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 28.
74. See id. at 27.
75. See id. at 28.
76. See id. at 139-40.
77. See id. at 138.
78. Id.
79. See Scalia, Canards, supra note 29, at 589-90. In a lecture at Case Western
Reserve School of Law, Justice Scalia stated:
Sometimes, of course, the highest court in the judicial system may come to
the conclusion that the result inescapably produced by the binding ab-
stractions is simply wrong-which means a return to the drawing board
and the construction of a superseding scheme that leads to the right result.
Such overrulings, I must acknowledge, involve a sacrifice of consistency.
Yet even while abandoning consistency in the particular case, the court
will affirm its enduring value for the system as a whole. For even as the
old rationale is abandoned, a new one is announced, which forms the basis
for a new scheme that is to be consistently followed.
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B. Criticisms of Textualism
Justice Scalia has undergone possibly the closest methodo-
logical scrutiny of any jurist in recent history. It is no surprise,
then, that some have criticized him with their criticism of textu-
alism as a whole. Commentators on textualism have set forth
various hypothetical situations as platforms for discussing tex-
tualism. Two of these platforms are the following: Church of the
Holy TrinityO and the wandering basketball player. 81
1. Church of the Holy Trinity
In his book on interpretation of federal laws, Justice Scalia
discusses a case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, as an
example of the danger of searching for the collective intent of the
legislature. 82 In 1892, a federal law criminalized helping an
"alien" immigrate to the United States to "perform[] labor or
service of any kind." 83 The Church of the Holy Trinity helped a
man, "an alien residing in England," immigrate to the United
States to serve as the church's rector and priest.84 The Supreme
Court held that the priest was not an "alien" brought to the
United States to "perform[] labor or service of any kind" for
purposes of the statute.85 The rationale the Court proffered for
departing from the text of the statute was that the statute was
only intended to reach manual laborers, not Christian ministers
or "brain-toilers."86 The Court held that the legislature could not
have intended to say what it did. It stated:
It must be conceded that the act of the [church] is within the
letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is
one of service, and implies labor on the one side with com-
pensation on the other .... It is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers .... 87
It is the duty of the courts under [certain] circumstances to
say that ... the act, although within the letter, is not within
80. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
81. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1553-56.
82. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 18-23.
83. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
84. Id. at 458.
85. See id. at 472.
86. See id. at 458.
87. Id. at 458-59.
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the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be
within the statute. 88
In Justice Scalia's view, the Court was not justified in
searching for meaning beyond the statute.89 According to Justice
Scalia, the Court's exception in Church of the Holy Trinity for
manual laborers did not make sense in light of the specific ex-
ceptions for actors, artists, lecturers, and singers.90 The priest
was from England and thus met the statutory definition of an
"alien." 91 The priest obviously performed "labor or service of
any kind."92 Thus, "[tihe defendant's act was within the letter of
the statute, and therefore within the statute: end of case."93
Professor William Eskridge has criticized Justice Scalia's
approach to Church of the Holy Trinity.94 In Professor Eskridge's
opinion, a plain meaning interpretation of a statute, such as the
statute in Church of the Holy Trinity, should take into account
Congress' unexpressed values, goals, and beliefs.95 He describes
Justice Scalia's approach as unreasonable because it does not
take these items into account.96 It is interesting, perhaps contra-
dictory, that Professor Eskridge reaches the same result as the
Court by applying the rule of lenity rather than solely from the
plain meaning.97
Professor Eskridge also sees the difference between Justice
Scalia's approach to the interpretation of statutes and his ap-
proach to interpretation of the Constitution as irreconcilable. 98
To illustrate, Professor Eskridge compares Justice Scalia's analy-
sis99 of Church of the Holy Trinity to Justice Scalia's approach in
the majority opinion in Printz v. United States.100 Professor
Eskridge describes Justice Scalia's approach to the Constitution
as a determination of the original meaning of the text as "histori-
88. Id. at 472.





94. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7.
95. See id. at 1549.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1553. According to the rule of lenity, any ambiguity in a criminal
statute is resolved in favor of the defendant. See id. at 1534.
98. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1516.
99. See id. at 1517.
100. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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cist."101 In contrast, Professor Eskridge describes Justice Scalia's
approach to statutes as a determination of what the words mean
as "linguistic." 102 In other words, Professor Eskridge questions
Justice Scalia's willingness to look at the history of the Constitu-
tion but not the legislative history of a statute. In noting this
perceived contrast, Professor Eskridge misses the point Justice
Scalia makes-that the inquiry is the same. In Justice Scalia's own
words: "What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I
look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what
the original draftsmen intended." 103
In Printz, Congress enacted a statute requiring states, on a
temporary basis, to operate certain aspects of a gun control pro-
gram for the federal government. 10 4 Local governments chal-
lenged the federal government's commandeering of their
resources.105 The federal government's position was that early
statutes enacted by the first Congress required state courts to re-
solve certain federal controversies.10 6 Justice Scalia authored the
Supreme Court opinion deciding in favor of the states. 07 He
noted state courts originally could act within their judicial
power to resolve federal controversies pursuant to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion.108 In contrast, these provisions of the Constitution did not
authorize the federal government to command state executives
to administer federal laws.10 9 Finding no authorization in the
Constitution for the federal government to commandeer state re-
sources, the Court invalidated the statute.11 0
A close look at Printz and Church of the Holy Trinity reveals
that the cases are so different that a comparison does not sup-
port an inference of a separate approach to constitutional versus
statutory cases. In Printz, Justice Scalia's reading of the text did
not answer the question at hand. i" Thus, Justice Scalia exam-
101. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1516 (citing Scalia, Role of Federal Courts,
supra note 7, at 45).
102. See id. at 1516.
103. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 38.
104. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902-04 (1997).
105. See id. at 905.
106. See id. at 905-06.
107. See id. at 943.
108. See id. at 907.
109. See id. at 907-09.
110. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-09.
111. See id. at 905 ("[Tlhere is no constitutional text speaking to this precise ques-
tion.").
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ined the Constitution for text authorizing the federal govern-
ment to commandeer state resources but found none. In Church
of the Holy Trinity, his reading of the text led to an obvious con-
clusion. 112 The statute provided a rule for him to follow. Absent
a text-based rule in Printz, it is no surprise that Justice Scalia
would fashion a concrete rule on the basis of the history of the
Constitution.
Professor Eskridge criticizes the approach in Printz as being
in tension with Justice Scalia's "belief that the Constitution
should not evolve to fulfill abstract principles, and his view that
judicial discretion must be limited by confining judges to the
application of plain meanings, not spongy spirits."113 A rule that
the federal government shall not control state governments does
not scream of abstraction. Professor Eskridge's criticism would
make more sense if Justice Scalia had reached a result on the ba-
sis that guns are good. By not saying something abstract such as
guns are good, Justice Scalia's approach in Printz illustrates his
mistrust of the "facts and circumstances" tests under common
law. 114 The text did not support the federal government's posi-
tion. If we know that the federal government shall not control
state governments, it is not necessary to attempt to figure out
when guns are good and when guns are bad on a case-by-case
basis.
Suppose Professor Eskridge is correct that Justice Scalia's
judicial opinions take a different approach to statutes than to the
Constitution. This disparity could be explained by the fact that
the statutes that Justice Scalia interprets are usually those that
were enacted during his lifetime. In other words, it would make
sense for him to feel more comfortable determining the original
meaning of words used in a contemporary statute as opposed to
the original meaning of words used in a more ancient document
such as the Constitution. This criticism of Justice Scalia's ap-
proach is unfounded.
2. The Wandering Basketball Player
Professor Eskridge uses an example from professional
sports to make a point about Justice Scalia's theory in relation to
Justice Scalia's practice. 115 During the 1997 National Basketball
112. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
113. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1517.
114. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 7, at 1180-82.
115. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1553-56.
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Association (NBA) playoffs in which New York played Miami, a
fight broke out.16 Mr. Patrick Ewing left the bench and paced
around at center court during the fight.n 7 The NBA suspended
him pursuant to its rule that players may not leave the bench
during a fight.118 Professor Eskridge does not appear to have a
problem with Mr. Ewing's suspension. Rather, he believes that
Justice Scalia's methodology applied to variations on Mr. Ew-
ing's fact pattern yields indeterminate results that must be based
on subjectivity.'1 9 Professor Eskridge sets forth the following six
scenarios and his conclusions regarding each one:
1. The player jumps off the bench and joins the fight-clear
violation
2. The player jumps off the bench and runs over to the fight
without joining in-clear violation
3. The player leaves the bench and wanders in mid-court,
not getting any closer to the fight-violation after consid-
eration of what the drafters intended to prevent
4. The player leaves the bench and moves as far away from
the fight as possible-unclear
5. Player leaves the bench to go to the bathroom-no viola-
tion
6. The fight spreads, and two players end up brawling in
front of the bench; a player leaves the bench to stop a sec-
ond player from choking a third player-no violation 120
Professor Eskridge says the first two scenarios are easy.1 21
Both acts are within both the letter and spirit of the rule, and
suspension is warranted. 122 The last two are within the letter of
the law but outside the spirit, and suspension is not war-
ranted. 123 Professor Eskridge believes that Justice Scalia would
not suspend the player under these two scenarios because one
would be a de minimus violation (scenario 5) and the other
116. See id. at 1509.
117. See id.
118. Rule 12A, § IX(c), of the NBA Rules provided: "During an altercation, all
players not participating in the game must remain in the immediate vicinity of their
bench. Violators will be suspended, without pay, for a minimum of one game ....
Id. at 1509 n.1.
119. See id. at 1555.
120. Id. at 1553-55.
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would be an absurd application of the rule (scenario 6).124 Ac-
cording to Professor Eskridge, situations 3 and 4 involve judg-
ment.125  Professor Eskridge's point is that Justice Scalia
represents his theory of textualism as mechanical and as a re-
straint on judges, i.e., free from normativity.126 But Professor
Eskridge believes the application of textualism in practice still
requires normative judgment, contrary to Justice Scalia's alleged
representations. 27 But normativity does not necessarily follow
from a requirement of judgment. Textualism represents a for-
malist ideal. No formal system answers every question, and
eventually some problems require human judgment. 28 This fact
does not infuse textualism with "spirit" and normativity.
In his section on normativity, Professor Eskridge finishes as
though he has shot down Justice Scalia's views with a silver bul-
let. He quotes a passage Justice Scalia wrote as evidence of Jus-
tice Scalia's normative approach:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forbears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they
make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they
were 'finding' it - discerning what the law is, rather than de-
creeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow
be.129
This statement is hardly evidence of a normative approach.
The making of law referred to in the passage Professor Eskridge
quotes is not an admission of normativity. On the contrary, Jus-
tice Scalia refers to the role of the judge as the finder of law
rather than a maker of law. If a judge determines what the law
is though it was previously unexpressed, she has just made law,
but in a positive sense rather than a normative sense. Thus, the




126. See id. at 1555. Others have pointed out that Justice Scalia's version of tex-
tualism separates interpretation from policy. See Zeppos, supra note 2, at 1619-20 &
n.145.
127. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1555.
128. See generally Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecid-
able Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1487 (1992) (concluding that Godel's Incompleteness Theorem
applies to the law).
129. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 7, at 1556 (alteration in original) (quoting James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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III. SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM
Tax law is complicated.130 The Commerce Clearinghouse
(CCH) soft-cover version of the Internal Revenue Code currently
takes up two volumes of statutory provisions, with six volumes
of accompanying regulations (which includes proposed regula-
tions). A proper tax library also includes the Cumulative Bulle-
tin, which contains countless rulings, procedures, and
announcements published by the Department of Treasury and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If these statutory provisions,
regulations, rulings, procedures, and announcements were the
sole bases for tax law, it would still be complicated. Predictable,
but complicated. With these statutory provisions, regulations,
rulings, procedures, and announcements, it would seem that
Congress, the Department of Treasury, and the IRS have com-
municated to taxpayers exactly what they need to know to plan
their affairs and determine the precise amount of tax to pay the
government each year. This is not so. These detailed statutory
provisions, regulations, rulings, procedures, and announce-
ments commingle with another dimension of vague, complex
judicial doctrines, the most pervasive of which come from the
substance-over-form family of doctrines.131 With a little help
130. Judge Learned Hand has commented on the complexity:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example,
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference
to cross-reference, exception upon exception -couched in abstract terms
that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused
sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport,
which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only
after the most ordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters
are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole
and casting out that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot
help recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel:
that they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one
cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance
save that the words are strung together with syntactical correctness.
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). See also Linda Gal-ler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1037, 1078-80 (1995); Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusion
of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319 (1994).
131. See generally Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49
U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982) (reviewing BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS (1981)) ("It is from these cases that the basic weapons
in the Commissioner's arsenal are derived- the business purpose doctrine, the step
transaction doctrine, 'substance over form,' and others. The effect of these doctrines
is the existence alongside the Internal Revenue Code of an additional (and some-
what autonomous) set of principles for deciding tax disputes."). See generally Boris
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from the Supreme Court, Judge Learned Hand gave birth to
these doctrines in Helvering v. Gregory by applying substance-
over-form principles to the Code.
132
A. Substance-Over-Form Doctrines
Substance-over-form principles can override a result
achieved by a technical reading of the text of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.133 These principles are not solely judicia.1 34 Statutory
and factual principles can also override the text of the Code. The





This section focuses mainly on the judicial doctrines, but the
analysis section of this article discusses factual and statutory
substance-over-form principles. Because of overlapping princi-
ples, a family tree of judicial doctrines is difficult to set forth in
graphic form. It might look something like this:
Judicial
Sham TransactionJ [ R e c aracterization
Business Econom ic Step Sham
Purpose Substance E
I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code,
21 How. L.J. 693, 695 (1978). It is also notable that the IRS has issued guidance pro-
claiming that the sham transaction doctrine applies to almost any transaction where
the anticipated pre-tax profit is not significant in relation to the anticipated tax
benefits. See Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-1 C.B. 835 (1999).
132. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
133. See David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 Tax
Law. 235, 237-41 (1999); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS-DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 46-58 (1999)
[hereinafter TAX SHELTER WHITE PAPER].
134. Hariton, supra note 133, at 238; see TAX SHELTER WHITE PAPER, supra note
133, at 35-46.
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Three of the above doctrines arose directly from the lan-
guage the Supreme Court used in Gregory v. Helvering.135 Some
of the factual and statutory principles probably also arose from
the same substance-over-form principles created by Judge
Learned Hand in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It
is interesting to note that the jurisprudence of sham entities
overlaps with factual substance-over-form principles.136 In addi-
tion, the sham transaction doctrine137 is often called the eco-
nomic substance doctrine,138 and transactions discussed in the
context of either the sham transaction doctrine or the economic
substance doctrine are often called economic or substantive
shams 139 (to be distinguished from factual shams).
B. Gregory v. Helvering
Mrs. Evelyn Gregory owned a company, United Mortgage
Corporation (United Mortgage), which in turn owned another
corporation, Monitor Securities Corporation (Monitor) .140
United Mortgage stood to make a large profit on the sale of its
shares in Monitor.141 It appears that Mrs. Gregory sought to put
the gain on the sale in her pocket while incurring as little tax as
possible. To do so, she created another corporation, called
Averill, with herself as the sole shareholder.142 United Mortgage
transferred Monitor to Averill, then Mrs. Gregory sold Averill1 43
135. See Moore, supra note 4, at 660-62. Judge Moore referred to the step-
transaction doctrine as the substance-over-form doctrine. See id. at 662. This isprobably because the first two Supreme Court cases after Gregory applying the step-
transaction doctrine held that substance controlled over form without mentioning
"step transactions." See Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945);Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938). The Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989), however, acknowledged that it was the step-
transaction doctrine that was applied in Court Holding and Minnesota Tea. Judge
Moore's article and Clark were published around the same time.136. In this article, references to "substance-over-form doctrines" are to the judi-
cial doctrines other than the sham entity doctrine.
137. See infra notes 156-220 and accompanying text.
138. See United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir.
2001).
139. See Appellant's Opening Brief, United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm'r,
254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-12720) (referring to the substantive sham doc-
trine).
140. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465(1935); see Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 223 (1932).
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Graphically, it looked like this.
Gregory..
United Mortge
Then, Mrs. Gregory created Averill, resulting in this structure:
Then, United Mortgage sold Monitor to Averill, which resulted
in the following:
Then, Mrs. Gregory liquidated Averill, causing her to receive the
shares in Monitor, which she subsequently sold.1 " After the
transaction, she remained the sole owner of United Mortgage
and had pocketed the gain on the Monitor shares. 145 She re-
ported capital gain income on the gain inherent in the Monitor
shares. 146
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found that the Internal Revenue Code provided for tax-free
treatment for the sale of Monitor to Averill as a reorganiza-
tion.147 Further, Mrs. Gregory was entitled to pay the lower
capital gain tax rate on the sale of Averill (and therefore the
Monitor shares) rather than the ordinary income tax rate she
would have paid had she received the Monitor shares directly
from United Mortgage.148 The Board of Tax Appeals found that
the Internal Revenue Code provided that Mrs. Gregory was enti-
tled to these tax benefits. 149 The Board stated that the Commis-
sioner could not argue in contradiction of the tax statutes:
Congress has not left it to the Commissioner to say, in the ab-
sence of fraud or other compelling circumstance, that the
corporate form may be ignored in some cases and recognized
in others. Whatever can be said of the wisdom of recogniz-
ing the corporate device, the taxing statutes have so plainly
accepted it and provided the detailed methods of taxing its
transactions, that to disregard it in a case like this would vary
the time, method and amount of tax which the statute im-
poses. 150
In addition to the Commissioner's hands being tied, the
Board of Tax Appeals believed that the Code bound the courts to
the following conclusion based on a textual reading of the Code:
[T]he incidence of the statute may be as favorable to the
Government in one case as it is unfavorable in another. A
statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a lit-
eral expression of the taxing policy, and leaves only the small
interstices for judicial consideration. The general legislative
plan apparently was to recognize the corporate entity and, in
view of such recognition, to specify when the gains or losses
would be recognized and upon what basis they should be
measured. We may not destroy the effectiveness of this
statutory plan by denying recognition to the corporation and
thus preventing consideration of its transactions.151
The IRS appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Judge Learned Hand wrote for the panel. First, he
agreed with the taxpayer and the Board of Tax Appeals that a
tax avoidance motive is irrelevant, noting that:
147. See Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 226 (1932).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 225.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 225-26.
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[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law,
does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire
to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possi-
ble; he is not even bound to choose that pattern which will
best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to in-
crease one's taxes.
152
Courts have often quoted this passage when holding that a
transaction that 'smells bad' is entitled to tax benefits.153 After
acknowledging the right to plan one's own taxes, Judge Hand
did an about-face, voicing his disagreement that the transaction
fit within what Congress intended:
[I]t does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a
transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition...
[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no
degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the set-
ting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.
154
On the basis of the above, Judge Hand concluded that the
transactions at issue did not fit within the meaning of the reor-
ganization statutes.
All these steps were real, and their only defect was that they
were not what the statute means by a "reorganization," be-
cause the transactions were no part of the conduct of the
business of either or both companies; so viewed, they were a
sham, though all the proceedings had their usual effect.
1 55
Appearing persuaded by Judge Hand's prose, the Supreme
Court adopted the Second Circuit's blueprint. Justice Suther-
152. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). This idea has been expressed in other ways. Justice Holmes stated, "[tihe
fact that [the taxpayer] desired to [escape taxation] is immaterial, because the very
meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can
if you do not pass it." Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930).
In another case, Judge Hand observed that "there is nothing [more] sinister in so
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible... nobody owes any pub-
lic duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not volun-
tary contributions." Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand,
J., dissenting).
153. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Estate
of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 869 n.2 (6th Cir. 1973); Hariton, supra note
133, at 242 (noting that this quote is "now quoted verbatim in almost every rechar-
acterization case which finds for the taxpayer").
154. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810-11.
155. Id. at 811.
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land tried to use his own prose to express a similar rationale, but
Judge Hand's language was far more eloquent.156 An interesting
aspect of the opinion is that the Supreme Court did not use the
term "sham," whereas Judge Hand did.157
C. The Standard Formulations of the Substance-Over-Form
Doctrines
Rather than overriding the Internal Revenue Code with an
explicit "facts and circumstances" test, lower courts have at-
tempted to develop a common-law approach to tax avoidance
through the substance-over-form doctrines. These attempts
have resulted in chaos. The various courts of appeals have not
agreed on which substance-over-form doctrines apply, how the
doctrines apply, or when the doctrines apply. This section dis-
cusses the standard formulations of the substance-over-form
doctrines, the Supreme Court cases giving rise to the doctrines,
and the confusion dividing the courts.
1. The Sham Transaction Doctrine
Of all the substance-over-form judicial doctrines, the sham
transaction doctrine probably has attracted the most debate.158
Under the standard sham transaction doctrine, a court may deny
the tax benefits of a transaction depending on the presence or
absence of two factors, economic substance and business pur-
156. See generally Helvering v. Gregory, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
157. Compare Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811, with Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465-70.
158. See generally Thomas C. Durham et al., Mrs. Gregory's Great-Grandchildren:
The Lost Generation, 2 J. TAX'N OF GLOBAL TRANSACTIONS 25 (2002) (discussing the
sham transaction doctrine, though calling it the economic substance doctrine); Mark
P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 (2001); David A.
Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73
(2001); Lee A. Sheppard, Why tie IRS Should Argue the Statute First, 92 TAX NOTES
465 (2001) (discussing UPS, a sham transaction case, though calling it an economic
substance case); Lee Sheppard, Economic Substance Abuse, 89 TAX NOTES 1095 (2000)(discussing the sham transaction doctrine, though calling it the economic substance
doctrine); Hariton, supra note 133 (discussing the sham transaction doctrine, though
calling it the economic substance doctrine); Richard M. Lipton, Brush Up Your Plan-
ning -More Lessons from the Colgate Case, 90 J. TAX'N 89 (1999) (discussing ACM, a
sham transaction case that called the doctrine the economic substance doctrine);
Paul J. Donahue, The Rule of Sheldon v. Commissioner: Is It an Economically Efficient
Evolution of the Sham Transaction Doctrine?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 165 (1993); Moore, supra
note 4; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated
Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981) (discussing sham transactions); Alan Gunn, Tax
Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1978).
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pose.159 Not all circuits that apply this doctrine agree whether a
lack of both business purpose and economic substance is re-
quired for denying the tax benefits, or if the lack of one or the
other suffices.160 In other words, the circuits do not agree
whether a taxpayer attempting to show entitlement to tax bene-
fits in court must demonstrate that a transaction had a business
purpose and economic substance or if it is sufficient to show that
the transaction had one or the other.
Another example of the sham transaction doctrine involves
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner.161 The taxpayer therein
bought a used computer, paid with credit from a leasing com-
pany consisting of approximately 80% non-recourse and 20%
full recourse debt.162 After the purchase of the computer, the
taxpayer leased the computer back to the leasing company. 163
Prior to entering into these transactions, the leasing company
had already subleased the computer.164 The taxpayer relied on
literature regarding the sale-leaseback arrangement highlighting
the tax benefits of the transaction, which included interest ex-
pense and accelerated depreciation deductions. 65
In affirming the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the sale-leaseback transaction was a sham
for tax purposes, because the transaction lacked both business
purpose and economic substance. 66 Regarding business pur-
pose, the court affirmed the lower court's finding that the tax-
payer's sole motivation for entering the transaction was tax
159. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
160. See United Parcel Serv. of America v Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir.
2001) (discussing the notion that a transaction is a sham if it lacks either economic
substance or business purpose); Horn v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(discussing the notion that a transaction is a sham if it lacks both economic sub-
stance and business purpose); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th
Cir. 1985) (discussing the notion that a transaction is a sham if it lacks both eco-
nomic substance and business purpose).
161. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184 (1.983), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
162. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985). A
nonrecourse loan is one where the creditor has no right to sue to collect the loan.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). Such loans are common when there
is an asset, such as a house, securing the loan. See id.
163. See Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91.
164. See id. at 92.
165. See id. at 92 n.3, 93.
166. See id. at 95.
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avoidance.167 This finding rested on the taxpayer's failure to
evaluate the sufficiency of residual value in the computer to
make a profit.168 With respect to economic substance, the court
held that the taxpayer could not realize any economic value
from the transaction.169 This finding rested on the court's accep-
tance of the conclusion of the court below as to the credibility of
the government's expert witnesses with respect to estimated re-
sidual value of the computer. 170 Because the transaction was a
sham, the court disallowed the taxpayer's interest expense de-
ductions.171
The two main Supreme Court cases since Gregory involving
the sham transaction doctrine are Knetsch v. United States172 and
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.173 The Court decided Gregory and
Knetsch in favor of the government, and Frank Lyon in favor of
the taxpayer.174 Of the Justices that decided these three cases,
only one remains on the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, the au-
thor of the dissenting opinion in Frank Lyon.'75 Nevertheless, de-
riving the sham transaction doctrine from these three Supreme
Court cases is a stretch. The Supreme Court has never provided
a clear formulation of the doctrine. The Supreme Court in Greg-
ory relied on the meaning of the word "reorganization" under
the statute. 76 There is no indication that the Court in Gregory
expected its pronouncement to apply to transactions outside the
Code's reorganization provisions.
In Knetsch, Mr. Karl F. Knetsch purchased $4 million of de-
ferred savings annuities bonds from an insurance company fi-
nanced with notes he issued at a higher rate to the same
company.177 He then borrowed back on his annuity to pay the
167. See id. at 95-96.
168. See id. at 94.
169. See Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 95.
170. See id. at 94-95.
171. See id. at 95.
172. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
173. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
174. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361 (1960); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
175. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 584-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69.
177. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362. Mr. Knetsch obtained the tax benefit as follows:
He purchased deferred savings annuities bonds with a face value of $4,000,000 from
an insurance company that yielded 2.5% for a price of $4,004,000. See id. He paid
$4,000 of the purchase price by check and issued nonrecourse notes to the company
for the remaining $4,000,000, secured by the bonds that required him to pay the in-
surance company 3.5%. See id. at 362-63. He then prepaid his interest payments
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interest on the larger amount he owed.178 In other words, he
loaned money to an insurance company with money he bor-
rowed from that company at a higher interest rate. Then, he
borrowed back the money he loaned. At the termination of the
annuities contract he purchased, Mr. Knetsch was to receive a
monthly annuity of approximately $90,000.179 After borrowing
against the annuity and obtaining huge tax benefits, however, all
that would have been left was enough for a monthly annuity of
less than $50.180
Under the Supreme Court's analysis, Mr. Knetsch's motive
or intent to reduce his tax burden was unimportant to the out-
come of the case. Instead, the Court examined "whether what
was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the
statute intended."181 It held "that there was nothing of substance
to be realized by [the taxpayer] from [the] transaction beyond a
tax deduction."18 2 The Court concluded that it was clear that
"Knetsch's transaction... did 'not appreciably affect his benefi-
cial interest except to reduce his tax."' 8 3 Accordingly, the Court
held that the transaction was a sham. 84
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion acknowledged that the
transaction was tax motivated, but pointed out that many trans-
actions are tax motivated. 85 He stated that the transactions
should be recognized for tax purposes unless Congress dictates
otherwise: "The remedy is legislative. Evils or abuses can be
particularized by Congress." 86 Further, he noted that Congress
every year deducting the entire amount even though he borrowed approximately
the amount of the interest accrued on his annuity bond from the insurance com-
pany (the amount he prepaid for interest is excluded in order to simplify by keep-
ing the numbers round). See id. at 362. In other words, he paid the insurance
company about $140,000 and received back about $100,000, leaving a net outflow of
about $40,000. See id. But he deducted the entire $140,000. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 362.
Assuming a tax rate of 90% for simplicity, he received a tax benefit of approxi-
fnately $126,000 ($140,000 x .90) for which he paid approximately $40,000. See id. at
362-364. Thus he obtained a net tax benefit of approximately $86,000. See id.
178. See id. at 363.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 365 (quoting Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935)).
182. Id. at 366.
183. Id. (citation omitted).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 371 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
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did change the law for tax years after the transactions at issue.187
Although on its face Knetsch looks like an override of the
statutory text with the judicial economic substance doctrine,
commentators have described Knetsch as a factual sham.188 Ex-
amination of the case reveals that it involved a lot of paper shuf-
fling. A dissenting opinion in a case with identical facts
supports this proposition. In United States v. Bond, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in favor of a taxpayer in the
same situation as Mr. Knetsch. 189 The dissenting judge ob-
served, however, that interest is a payment for use of money,
and that the insurance company did not actually give the tax-
payer any money or economic benefit on which to make a pay-
ment of interest.190 This analysis indicates that Knetsch was
resolvable by looking at whether the debt was actual or not,
rather than whether the text of the statute should be overridden
by a judicial doctrine.
Frank Lyon also involved a factual analysis. In that case, the
Supreme Court found for the taxpayer.1 91 The Worthen Bank &
Trust Company (Worthen) originally purchased the site for a
building, but the bank's regulators would not approve the pro-
posed financing for constructing it.192 After considering various
options, Frank Lyon Company (Lyon), the taxpayer, offered to
purchase and lease the building back to the bank.193 Lyon pur-
chased the building from Worthen with financing from First Na-
tional City Bank and New York Life Insurance Company and
leased it back to Worthen. 194 Lyon, as owner of the building,
took depreciation deductions on the building.195
The Commissioner challenged the deductions on the
ground that in substance Worthen owned the building, not
Lyon.196 The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the sale-and-leaseback arrangement was a sham.197
187. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 370.
188. See Hariton, supra note 133, at 246 ("The Supreme Court held, fairly enough,
that there was no interest deduction because there was no borrowing at all -just a
net payment to the insurance company in exchange for purported tax benefits.").
189. See United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577, 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1958).
190. See id. at 584-85 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
191. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
192. See id. at 563-64.
193. See id. at 564.
194. See id. at 564-65.
195. See id. at 568.
196. See id. at 568-69.
197. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84.
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The taxpayer convinced the Court that it had a business purpose
and would likely attain economic benefits.198 The Court stated
that a transaction should be respected for tax purposes if it is "a
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance
which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory re-
alities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is
not shaped solely by tax avoidance features." 199 In holding for
the taxpayer, the Court stated: "[So long as [a party to a transac-
tion] retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional
[type of party to the transaction], the form of the transaction
adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes."200 In reaching
its holding, the Court did not rely on Gregory or Knetsch. Instead
of providing a clear formulation of the rule it applied, the Court
listed a number of factors as to why the taxpayer was the owner
of the building at issue.20 1
The requirement of economic substance may exist inde-
pendent of the requirement of business purpose. In the Sixth
and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, for example, a lack
of economic substance is sufficient to find that a transaction is a
sham without mentioning business purpose. 2 2 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals found a lack of business purpose fatal to a tax-
payer's claimed tax benefits without a discussion of economic
substance. 203 Interestingly, an earlier case in the same circuit had
concluded that both factors were necessary to a sham analysis.20
4
A transaction has economic substance if it provides an eco-
nomic benefit of some consequence to the taxpayer separate and




201. See id. (listing factors such as the competition Worthen Bank faced, under-
capitalization of Worthen, legal restraints on Worthen, advice from regulators, the
presence of an independent third party, the presence of potential financial organiza-
tions, the bargaining process, the independence of Lyon Bank, Worthen's motiva-
tion, risk, the absence of family involvement, and the various legal relationships
found).
202. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.
2001); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Pasternak
v. Comm'r, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993) ("If the transaction lacks economic sub-
stance, then the deduction must be disallowed without regard to the niceties of the
taxpayer's intent."); Mahoney v. Comm'r, 808 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir. 1987).
203. See ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
204. See Horn v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
205. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364
F.2d 734, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1966); Hariton, supra note 133, at 249.
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action has economic substance if the transaction earned an actual
pretax profit.206 Sometimes a nominal profit suffices, 207 some-
times it does not.208
The business purpose factor is somewhat less straightfor-
ward compared to the economic substance factor. At least three
formulations of business purpose have percolated through the
courts. First, Judge Hand found that if the purpose of a transac-
tion contradicts or defeats the purported form of the transaction
then courts may sometimes deny tax benefits sought by using
that form.209 Commentators refer to this particular formulation
as one of statutory interpretation because courts applying this
formulation inquire as to whether the form prescribed by Con-
gress was intended to permit the particular transaction to go un-
taxed.210 An example of a case applying the economic substance
doctrine cast as an inquiry into congressional intent is Horn v.
Commissioner.211
Second, courts sometimes apply a pure subjective business
purpose test. Rice's Toyota World is an example of this version of
business purpose. 212 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that the transaction lacked business pur-
pose.213 The court found one of the subsidiary findings of the
Tax Court relevant: the level of inquiry into certain aspects of the
transaction.214 The court also found support for the taxpayer's
lack of business purpose in the literature the taxpayer had avail-
able to evaluate the transaction.215 The literature distributed to
the taxpayer regarding the transaction "emphasized the large
206. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)
(reversing the Tax Court's finding that the transaction lacked economic substance
on the basis that the Tax Court had miscalculated by finding that there was no pre-
tax profit).
207. See id. (stating that profit of $1.7 million was sufficient for economic sub-
stance even though the transactions at issue involved more than $800 million in
shares of stock in Royal Dutch Shell).
208. See Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738, 768-69 (1990) (stating that the transac-
tion lacked economic substance even though the taxpayer earned a nominal profit).
209. See Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
210. See Durham et al., supra note 158, at 25.
211. See Horn v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The D.C. Circuit ap-
peared to abandon this statutory interpretation approach in ASA Investerings Part-
nership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and Del Commercial
Properties v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d 210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
212. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1985).
213. See id. at 94.
214. See id. at 92.
215. See id. at 93.
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tax deductions the transaction would produce, not the potential
for profit." 21
6
Third, courts sometimes apply a business purpose or ongo-
ing business test. An example of this version is United Parcel
Service v. Commissioner.217 In that case, the court reversed the Tax
Court's application of the sham transaction doctrine.21 8 United
Parcel Service (UPS) sought tax savings by restructuring its ex-
cess value business as insurance provided by an overseas coin-
pany.21 9 There, the fact that UPS sought tax savings did not
negate business purpose.220 "[A] transaction has a 'business
purpose,' when we are talking about a going concern like UPS,
as long as it figures in a bona fide, profit-seeking business." 221
The court added, "This concept of 'business purpose' is a neces-
sary corollary to the venerable axiom that tax-planning is per-
missible." 222
2. The Recharacterization Doctrines
Another set of substance-over-form doctrines in tax law is
recharacterization doctrines. The IRS often invokes the power to
recharacterize transactions in certain instances.223 According to
at least one commentator, the judicial versions of this power are
limitless and are much more problematic than the sham transac-
216. Id. The court of appeals appears somewhat impressionable in this regard.
What if the taxpayer had read books such as ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)? Or what if the IRS had
provided evidence that the taxpayer had read periodicals such as THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL or PLAYBOY?
217. See United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.
2001).
218. See id. at 1020.
219. See id. at 1016.
220. See id. at 1020.
221. Id. at 1019.
222. Id. The outcome in United Parcel Service contrasts with the outcome in
Winn-Dixie, decided eight days later in the same circuit. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit-even though it found that UPS's arrangement was fine because it was a
continuation of the taxpayer's business- disallowed the tax benefits that Winn-
Dixie reported from entering into a company-owned life insurance program (com-
monly referred to as a COLI program). See id. at 1316-17. The distinguishing fea-
ture between these cases can best be put the way Mr. Mark P. Gergen described
ACM: "The message is that you can pick up tax gold if you find it in the street while
going about your business, but you cannot go hunting for it." . Gergen, supra note
158, at 140.
223. See Hariton, supra note 133, at 238-39.
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tion doctrine. 224 An often-invoked manifestation of the recharac-
terization power is the step-transaction doctrine. 225 Under the
standard step-transaction doctrine, a series of formally inde-
pendent steps is treated as a single, integrated transaction if the
steps satisfy one of three tests. 226
First, a series of transactions may be integrated into one if,
at the time of entering into the series of prearranged transac-
tions, the taxpayer intended the end result.227 This is commonly
known as the "end result" test.228 Application of this test re-
quires examination of the actual intent of the taxpayer, regard-
less of the purported form of chosen transactions. 229 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit appears to have invoked this test
exclusively. 230
Second, a series of transactions may be integrated into one if
each of the steps is interdependent. 231 This is commonly known
as the "interdependence" test.232 To describe this test another
way, a taxpayer may see a series of her transactions integrated if
one of the transactions would have been pointless without the
completion of the entire series of transactions.233 Courts have
examined both the intent and the chosen forms of the transac-
tions in applying this test.234
Third, a series of transactions may be integrated into one if
there was a binding commitment to complete the entire series.235
This is commonly known as the "binding commitment" test.236
Application of this test requires examination of the form of the
transaction or transactions at issue.237 Intent is irrelevant. 238 An
224. See id. at 239.
225. See Gaw v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, 1226-28 (T.C. 1995), aff d, 111
F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927
F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991); Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-30 (1987);
King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969).




230. See Brown v. United States, 782 F.2d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining
Davis v. Comm'r, 746 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Russell v. Comm'r, 832 F.2d
349, 352 (6th Cir. 1987).




235. See id. at 1429.
236. See id.
237. See Gaw, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1226-28; Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429.
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interesting aspect of this test is that taxpayers and the govern-
ment alike have had success invoking it.239 When a corporate
taxpayer invokes it, he or she can qualify for certain types of tax
benefits, such as non-recognition of gain in a merger context.240
Courts and commentators mention Gregory, Commissioner v.
Court Holding, and United States v. Cumberland Public Services Co.
when discussing this doctrine. 241 None of these cases, nor any
other Supreme Court cases, have applied the end result, inter-
dependence, or binding commitment test.
Court Holding involved a real estate deal, 242 whereby a cor-
poration with two shareholders entered into an oral agreement
to sell an apartment building to a potential buyer.243 The corpo-
ration's tax lawyer called the transaction to a halt before the
buyer and seller inked the deal.244 He advised that the partici-
pants could remove some of the tax burden if the shareholders,
rather than the corporation, sold the property. 245 As a result, the
corporation liquidated the property to the shareholders, who in
turn sold the property to the buyer.246 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the Tax Court's finding that, in substance, no liquidation
of the corporation had occurred.247 Instead, the Court held that
the corporation-not the shareholders-had sold the property to
the buyer.248
238. See id.
239. See, e.g., McDonald's Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1982) (sustaining taxpayer's invocation of the step-transaction doctrine); King En-
ters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (sustaining taxpayer's invoca-
tion of the step-transaction doctrine); Heintz v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 132 (1955)
(sustaining taxpayer's invocation of the step-transaction doctrine); True v. United
States, 190 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 1999) (sustaining the IRS's invocation of the step-
transaction doctrine); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d
1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (sustaining the IRS's invocation of the step-transaction doc-
trine); Davis v. Comm'r, 746 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1984) (sustaining the IRS's invocation
of the step-transaction doctrine).
240. See King Enters., 418 F.2d at 511 (discussing a taxpayer who relied on the
interdependence test to qualify as reorganization receiving non-recognition treat-
ment on stock received when it had received stock, notes, and cash just prior to a
statutory merger).
241. See Kluener v. Comm'r, 154 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1998); Esmark v.
Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171, 194 (1988), affd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
242. See Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 332-33 (1945).
243. Se id.




248. See Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 334.
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This case illustrates nicely the step-transaction doctrine be-
cause it contained a series of transactions. First, the corporation
liquidated the apartment to the shareholders. Next, the share-
holders sold the apartment to the buyer. Viewing the series of
transactions as an integrated whole, the Supreme Court ignored
the participation of the shareholders in the sale and the liquida-
tion of the corporation. Accordingly, the Court held the corpo-
ration, rather than the shareholders, sold the property to the
buyer.
On the other hand, the holding of the case seems artificial.
It appears that the Supreme Court focused on what could have
happened rather than what actually happened. One commenta-
tor has noted that a liquidation such as the one in Court Holding
is a creature of statute, not dependent on who negotiated the
subsequent transaction.249 This view is supported by the fact
that the Supreme Court decided differently Cumberland Public
Services on almost the same facts when the evidence showed that
it was the shareholders who negotiated the deal from the start
rather than the corporation. 250 The commentator called the focus
on negotiations "baffling." 251
A close cousin to the step-transaction doctrine is the sham
entity doctrine. Many cases can be characterized as sham entity
cases, although they are not often described as such. In a sham
entity case, the court disregards the participation of an entity
that acts as a mere conduit.25 2 Usually something about the en-
tity merits such treatment. For example, in Aiken Industries v.
Commissioner, the court disregarded the participation of a corpo-
ration created for the sole purpose of borrowing money from
one related corporation and then loaning the same money to an-
other related corporation on the same terms. 253 At first glance, it
seems ridiculous for one company to serve as an intermediary
between two companies borrowing and lending the money on
the same terms. This scenario conjures up images of the First
Citiwide Exchange Bank portrayed on Saturday Night Live,
which existed for the sole purpose of providing change to its
249. See Isenbergh, supra note 131, at 873.
250. See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
251. See Isenbergh, supra note 131, at 872 & n.56 (discussing Court Holding Co.
and noting that the decision was corrected in Cumberland Pub. Serv.).
252. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997);
Aiken Indus. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
253. See Aiken Indus., 56 T.C. at 934.
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customers.254 Borrowing and lending on the same terms is as
likely to yield profit as exchanging a $10 bill for ten $1 bills.
Both are senseless transactions, seeming to exist only for enter-
tainment value.
The taxpayer in Aiken Industries probably did not have en-
tertainment in mind. The taxpayer was a United States company
that was a subsidiary of a Bahamian parent.255 The taxpayer had
borrowed money from its parent corporation, and had to pay
withholding tax on the interest on the loan paid back to the par-
ent corporation in the Bahamas.256 To avoid this withholding
tax, a corporation was formed in Honduras, where a treaty was
in place exempting interest from withholding tax paid on inter-
est from a United States borrower to a Honduran noteholder. 25 7
The parent corporation transferred its note to the Honduran
corporation, and claimed an exemption from withholding tax
under the treaty. 258 The court held that this Honduran corpora-
tion deserved no respect for tax purposes because all it did was
interpose itself between a loan from the Bahamian parent and
the United States borrower.259 It engaged in no other business.260
In contrast, courts will respect a related intermediary be-
tween a corporation and a third party that engaged in business.
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner (NIPSCO) in-
254. See Saturday Night Live: First Citizvide Exchange Bank I1 (NBC television
broadcast, Oct. 8, 1988), available at
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/88/88achangebank2.phtil (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
The following is an excerpt from the mock commercial:
Bank Representative: A lot of people don't realize that change is a two-
way street. You can come in with sixteen quarters, eight dimes, and four
nickels-we can give you a five-dollar bill. Or we can give you five singles.
Or two singles, eight quarters, and ten dimes. You'd be amazed at the va-
riety of the options you have.
Bank Representative: All the time, our customers ask us, "How do you
make money doing this?" The answer is simple: Volume. That's what we
do.
Id.
255. See Aiken Indus., 56 T.C. at 926.
256. See id. at 930.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 931.
259. See id. at 934 ("In effect, Industrias, while a valid Honduran corporation,
was a collection agent with respect to the interest it received from MPI. Industrias
was merely a conduit for the passage of interest payments from MPI to ECL, and it
cannot be said to have received the interest as its own.").
260. See id. at 926 ("During the years 1964 and 1965, the only income received by
Industrias was interest income in the amounts of 232,500 lempiras and 350,000 lem-
piras, respectively ....").
2003]
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volved such an arrangement.261 The taxpayer needed to borrow
money and found it could borrow from lenders in the Eurobond
market at a cheaper interest rate than it could domestically. 262
The taxpayer set up a subsidiary in a treaty country to avoid
paying withholding tax on interest paid back to the lenders. 263
The subsidiary borrowed money from the Eurobond market and
then loaned the same money at a higher interest rate to the par-
ent corporation in the United States.264 When the parent corpo-
ration paid the subsidiary, the subsidiary invested the profit it
made on the transaction.265 Even though the subsidiary was
formed solely to trigger the withholding exemption provisions
of the treaty, the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit both respected the entity for tax purposes.266
The Supreme Court cases that form the basis for deciding
"conduit" cases are Higgins v. Smith267 and Moline Properties v.
Commissioner.268 In Smith, Mr. Smith formed a corporation to
buy and sell securities, allowing him to control the timing of the
realization of gains and losses on the purchases and sales of the
securities for tax purposes. 269 The wholly-owned corporation
did not engage in any business beyond serving Mr. Smith's in-
dividual tax needs.270 The Supreme Court saw the issue as how
to tax transactions between a taxpayer and a wholly-owned cor-
poration. 271  The Court disregarded the corporate form and
found in favor of the revenue collector.272
Soon after deciding Smith, the Supreme Court decided
Moline Properties.273  Moline Properties involved a taxpayer-
corporation organized by an individual who sought to have the
taxpayer-corporation disregarded for tax purposes.274 A lender
had requested that the individual form the corporation to hold
261. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506, 506, 514 (7th Cir. 1997).
262. See id. at 508.
263. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 341,347 (1995), affd, 115 F.3d 506
(7th Cir. 1997).
264. See id. at 355.
265. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 115 F.3d at 514.
266. See id.; N. Ind. Pub. Sero. Co., 105 T.C. at 356.
267. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
268. See Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
269. See Smith, 308 U.S. at 474-75.
270. See id. at 474.
271. See id. at 482 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 480.
273. See Moline Props., 319 U.S. at 436.
274. See id. at 436.
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mortgage and title to certain property for security purposes.275
As holder of title, the taxpayer-corporation litigated on behalf of,
refinanced, and leased out portions of the property.276 On the
sale of part of the property, the individual reported the gain on
his own returns rather than the taxpayer-corporation's re-
turns.277 For the sale of another part, the taxpayer-corporation
reported the gain but the owner filed for a tax refund.278 The
Court refused to disregard the taxpayer-corporation. It stated:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in
business life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage
under the law of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to
comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the crea-
tor's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that
purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed
by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpo-
ration remains a separate taxable entity.279
With some exceptions, courts have read Moline as prohibit-
ing the disregard of an entity or its participation in a series of
transactions if the entity had a business purpose or carried on
business activity. For example, the Tax Court and Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit followed Moline in NIPSCO, dis-
cussed above. 280 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the Tax Court's reliance on Moline for the
proposition that the IRS could not disregard a particular sub-
sidiary corporation if it conducted "substantive business activ-
ity- even minimal activity." 281
Taxpayers should beware that courts might ignore Moline,
regardless of whether the taxpayer brings it to the court's atten-
tion. In Del Commercial Properties v. Commissioner, for example,
the Tax Court made a factual finding that a subsidiary indistin-
guishable from the subsidiary in NIPSCO carried on "minimal
business activity."282 The taxpayer argued on appeal that Moline,
275. See id. at 437-38.
276. See id. at 437-38.
277. See id. at 438.
278. See id.
279. Moline Props., 319 U.S. at 438-39 (footnotes omitted).
280. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1997); N.
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 341, 347-48 (1995), affd, 115 F.3d 506 (7th
Cir. 1997).
281. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 115 F.3d at 511.
282. See Del Commercial Props. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183, 1184 (1999),
affd, 251 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The author represented the taxpayer in this case
in its appeal and in petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari.
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as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in NIPSCO, prevented tax
law from disregarding the subsidiary in Del Commercial.283 The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit failed to mention Moline-
binding Supreme Court precedent-at all.2 84
The confusing nature of these doctrines can be further illus-
trated by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addition to
the step-transaction doctrine. As discussed, the standard step-
transaction formulation included three tests -interdependence,
binding commitment, and end result.285 In Del Commercial, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit added a fourth test, which
other circuits have said is irrelevant to a step-transaction analy-
sis: business purpose. 286 At various points in the Court of Ap-
peals opinion in Del Commercial, the court refers to ASA
Investerings for guidance as to how to analyze step-transaction
cases. 287 This reference is curious because ASA Investerings was
not a step-transaction case; rather, it was a sham entity case.288
In Del Commercial, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ap-
pears to have assumed that ASA Investerings was a step-
transaction case.289 However, the ASA Investerings opinion did
not use the term "step transaction," nor does it use language one
would have associated with step transaction cases, such as "in-
tegration," "series of steps," or "series of transactions." 290
283. See Brief for Appellant at 29-30, Del Commercial Props. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d
210 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1313).
284. See id. at iv, 22-33.
285. See discussion supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
286. See Del Commercial Props. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see
also True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1156, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
presence of a business purpose in a step-transaction case was not dispositive); As-
sociated Wholesale Grocers v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the presence of a business purpose in a step transaction case was not
dispositive); Reef Corp. v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 125, 133 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the presence of a business purpose in a step transaction case was not dispositive).
287. See Del Commercial, 251 F.3d at 213-15.
288. See ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998) ("The
primary issue for decision is whether these corporations formed a valid partnership
for Federal income tax purposes."), affid, 201 F.3d 505, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Getting
to the controlling issue, petitioner argues that under the standard established in
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 87 L. Ed. 1499, 63 S. Ct. 1132
(1943), the partnership cannot be regarded as a sham.").
289. The court cited ASA Investerings v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir.
2000), for the proposition that, "[in step-transaction cases, 'the existence of formal
business activity is a given but the inquiry turns on the existence of a nontax busi-
ness motive."' Del Commercial, 251 F.3d at 214.
290. See ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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D. Indeterminacy
Recent cases illustrate the indeterminacy of these doctrines.
A number of courts of appeals disagreed with the conclusion the
courts below reached in applying these doctrines. Examples of
these are Compaq Computer Corporation v. Commissioner,291 IES In-
dustries v. United States,292 United Parcel Service,293 and Boca
Investerings v. United States.294
In the descriptions of the standard substance-over-form
cases above, it should be apparent that aside from the sham en-
tity or factual sham doctrine, the text of the Internal Revenue
Code does not authorize the above applications of the standard
formulations of the substance-over-form doctrines.295 This lack
of statutory authority does not mean the cases are wrong. Such
applications could follow from the Code from a non-textualist
perspective.
Some vestiges of non-textualism still exist on the Supreme
Court. Justice Stevens' method of statutory interpretation stands
in stark contrast to Justice Scalia's. 296 Justice Stevens prefers the
common-law method that Justice Scalia avoids.297 Under this
method, the substance-over-form doctrines might still be devel-
oping. If this statement is true, perhaps in another one-hundred
years taxpayers will be able to predict when courts will use one
291. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'g 113
T.C. 214 (1999).
292. IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'g No. C97-206,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22, 1999).
293. United Parcel Serv. of America v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001),
rev'g 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999).
294. Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'g
167 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2001).
295. Courts often admit as much when they note that the law changed after the
transaction at issue occurred. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960);
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); Compaq Com-
puter Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). However, it was not actually
necessary to admit that the text did not answer the question when a court could just
cite Gregory for the proposition that the text is irrelevant because "the meaning of a
sentence [in a statute] may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is
more than the notes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), affd,
293 U.S. 465 (1935).
296. See Popkin, supra note 31, at 1134 ("Justice Scalia's main judicial rival is Jus-
tice Stevens.").
297. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502
(1984) ("[T]he content of the rule is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather
is given meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.").
See also William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opin-
ions of Justice Stevens, 1999 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1105-10 (1989).
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of these doctrines and which version. Until then, the substance-
over-form doctrines remove hope for certainty in tax planning.
If the substance-over-form doctrines still are valid, the IRS and
the courts have a choice as to whether or not they want to follow
the text of the statute. This leaves a taxpayer to guess whether
the IRS or a court will find that a transaction "smells bad"298 and
thus will use one of the doctrines to override the text of the
Code.
On the other hand, it seems that the IRS should have some
way to combat abusive tax avoidance, whatever that may be.299
It appears that the Internal Revenue Code and available guid-
ance is intended to answer all questions for taxpayers trying to
go about their business. But according to Gdel's Incomplete-
ness Theorem, any formal system must remain either incomplete
or inconsistent. 300 Perhaps this theorem explains why it is so dif-
ficult to determine exactly what is tax avoidance.301 Without
these doctrines it would seem that taxpayers could always find
ways to take advantage of the incompleteness or inconsistency
in the tax laws. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court will uphold the sham transaction doctrine, business pur-
pose doctrine, economic substance doctrine, or step transaction
doctrine.
IV. ANALYSIS
To say that tension exists between textualism and sub-
298. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dis-
senting) (referring to the majority's conclusion as akin to a "smell test." "If the
scheme in question smells bad, the intent to avoid taxes defines the result as we do
not want the taxpayer to 'put one over."').
299. See generally George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Con-
trolling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 658-60 (1985) (noting the diffi-
culty of defining tax avoidance).
300. See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 128, at 1466-67.
Fortunately for mathematicians (lest they be out of work), Kurt Godel
proved in 1931 that Hilbert's proposed formal system does not exist. Spe-
cifically, Godel demonstrated that formal systems powerful enough to ex-
press the axioms and propositions of arithmetic cannot be both complete
and consistent. Instead, these systems must contain either statements that
are neither provable nor disprovable within the system, or at least two in-
consistent statements that are both provable within the system. In either
case, proof or disproof of these statements can only be accomplished with
extra-systemic insight.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 1487 (concluding that Godel's Incompleteness
Theorem applies to the law).
301. See generally Cooper, supra note 299, at 658-60.
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stance-over-form doctrines may state the obvious. The terms
themselves reflect the tension. "Form," in essence, refers to for-
mal legal text, what textualism hails as controlling. "Substance
over form," in essence, refers to the eschewal of that formal text
in favor of substance. Commentators have examined the history
of our legal system to identify periods where form controlled
and where substance controlled.302 In periods when form con-
trolled, courts did not depart from formal textual sources of
law.30 3 In periods when substance controlled, courts did not re-
main bound by these formal texts.304 In short, substance and
form cannot both control.
The Supreme Court has not commented on any of the stan-
dard formulations of substance-over-form judicial doctrines
since Justice Scalia joined the Court. But if the Court is becom-
ing more textualist, further inquiry into how the three branches
of government have been shaping tax law as well as the charac-
teristics of tax law itself may assist in determining if the Su-
preme Court would affirm any of the standard formulations
today.
A. The Judicial Branch-Recent Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to
comment on the efficacy of the substance-over-form doctrines
since Justice Scalia's appointment.3 5 Perhaps it has denied cer-
tiorari in these cases to send the message that a "facts and cir-
cumstances" test, even if it infuses the tax laws with undesired
uncertainty, is better than allowing people to abuse the tax laws.
Perhaps the justices do not realize the chaos and uncertainty im-
posed under the current regime.
It is also possible that the Supreme Court has commented
302. See generally William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study
in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985).
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002); Del Commercial Props. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210
(D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002); ASA Investerings P'ship v.
Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000); ACM P'ship v.
Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Herrington v.
Comm'r, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989); Gardner v.
Comm'r, 954 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nor. Falk v. Comm'r, 504 U.S.
910 (1992); Cook v. Comm'r, 941 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857
(1991); Lerman v. Comm'r, 939 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984
(1991).
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on whether judicial doctrines can override the text of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code through other non-substance-over-form cases.
Recent cases have taken a literal interpretation of the Code. For
example, in Gitlitz the taxpayer received a double tax benefit
under a plain reading of the Code. 306 In that case, the taxpayers
owned a corporation organized under subchapter S of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.307 In such a corporation, the Internal Reve-
nue Code taxes the shareholders directly instead of the
corporation.30 8 The corporation realized an approximately $2
million discharge of indebtedness.309 Under the Code, a dis-
charge of indebtedness is generally considered income.310 There
is an exception, however, for insolvency. 311 At the same time,
subchapter S allowed the taxpayers to increase their cost bases in
the corporation, another tax benefit, because it allowed the tax-
payers to deduct other losses it could not previously deduct.312
The IRS denied the double benefit.313 Indeed, neither the IRS nor
the courts have historically allowed double tax benefits even if
the text of the Code supported it.314 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court read the Internal Revenue Code as plainly allowing the
double benefit.315
In United States v. Brockamp, the Supreme Court refused to
apply traditional judicially-developed equity principles to cer-
tain limitations provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.316
Taxpayers in two different docketed cases argued in Brockamp
that the statute of limitations on a refund claim should have
been tolled during the time that each taxpayer was disabled un-
der the equitable tolling doctrine.317 The Supreme Court rejected
the taxpayers' arguments on the ground that relevant Internal
Revenue Code provisions precluded the application of equitable
306. See Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206, 219-20 (2001).
307. See id. at 209. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
308. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 209.
309. See id. at 210.
310. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 213.
311. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (1994); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 213.
312. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220.
313. See id. at 208.
314. See Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934); see also United
States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969) (requiring a "clear declaration of
intent by Congress" before allowing a double benefit).
315. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220.
316. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1997).
317. See id. at 348.
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tolling.318 Unlike other limitations tolling provisions, which con-
tain simple language, the refund limitation provision was "un-
usually emphatic." 319 By emphatic, the Court meant that the
refund limitations provisions seemed to state in numerous parts
that no exceptions applied. 320 The limitations provisions were
"set forth in a highly detailed technical manner that linguisti-
cally speaking cannot be read as containing explicit excep-
tions."321
The Supreme Court has mentioned the step transaction doc-
trine in one case, but did not apply it in a substance-over-form
context. Commissioner v. Clark addressed the characterization of
a cash payment the taxpayer received as a result of a reorganiza-
tion.322 The taxpayer treated the payment, often referred to as
boot, as a capital gain.323 The Commissioner recharacterized the
payment as a dividend, treating it as ordinary income.324 Al-
though the Court examined the transaction as a whole, it did not
use the doctrine to override the text of the Internal Revenue
Code as is done in substance-over-form cases. Rather, the Court
found that the language of the statute required the examination
of the steps of the transaction as an integrated whole.325
In Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court
read the language of the tax regulations narrowly, allowing the
taxpayer a benefit that had been denied on the economic sub-
stance doctrine by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
326
In Cottage Savings, the taxpayer-banks relied on the plain lan-
guage of tax regulations to take tax losses on loan portfolios by
trading with other banks for economically equivalent loan port-
folios.327 The taxpayers entered into the transactions because the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the taxpayers' federal
regulator, apparently wanted to give the taxpayers a tax
break.328 For a limited period of time, it allowed the taxpayers to
exchange loan portfolios without accounting for any losses on
318. See id. at 350-52.
319. Id. at 350.
320. See id. at 351-52.
321. Id. at 350.
322. See Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989).
323. See id. at 732.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 737-38.
326. See generally Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
327. See id. at 567-68.
328. See id. at 557.
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the books as long as the loan portfolios were the same economi-
cally. 329 This process allowed a taxpayer to incur a tax loss be-
fore it incurred economic loss. 330 Although the regulations
allowed a taxpayer to recognize the tax effect of an exchange for
materially different property, the IRS disallowed the losses.331
In Tax Court, one of the arguments the IRS made was that
the transactions lacked economic substance and business pur-
pose. 332 The Tax Court described the IRS's argument as follows:
"[The IRS] contends that [the taxpayer's] claimed losses lack
substance and are not allowable under section 165(a) because the
transfers were solely tax-motivated and resulted in no signifi-
cant change in petitioner's economic position." 333
The Tax Court agreed that the transactions were solely tax-
motivated, but held that it nevertheless could not disregard the
transactions for tax purposes because they had economic sub-
stance.334 The Tax Court's point was essentially that if one per-
son exchanges an apple for an orange of the same value, the
person now sits in an economically different situation because
he has an orange rather than an apple, even if both fruits were of
the same value and the exchange was tax motivated. The Tax
Court seemed uncomfortable in allowing tax benefits for a
purely tax-motivated transaction. It stated: "We take the tax law
as we find it." 335
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with the
IRS's invocation of the economic substance doctrine and re-
versed the Tax Court.336 Without really addressing the Tax
Court's point that an apple and an orange are economically dif-
ferent even if they have the same value, the Sixth Circuit set
forth numerous economic substance and substance-over-form
cases. 337 On the basis of these cases, the Sixth Circuit decided




331. See id. at 558.
332. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 372, 384-85 (1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d
848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
333. Id. at 384-85.
334. See id. at 385, 387, 401.
335. Id. at 402.
336. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 890 F.2d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
499 U.S. 554 (1991).
337. See id. at 853-54.
338. See id. at 854-55.
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the IRS did not
argue that the economic substance doctrine applied.339 Rather,
the IRS argued that the taxpayer should not be allowed to take
losses from a transaction exchanging loan portfolios that were
economic substitutes.340 Under this economic substitute theory,
a determination of whether the loan portfolios were materially
different required an inquiry into whether "the parties, the rele-
vant market (in this case the secondary mortgage market), and
the relevant regulatory body (in this case the FHLBB) would
consider them [materially different] ."341
The Court rejected this test because it was subjective, too
complicated, and incompatible with the Internal Revenue
Code. 342 It was subjective because it called for a consensus of
opinions.343 It was too complicated because the Court concluded
it was unlikely that the relevant Code section required the tax-
payer and the IRS to determine the relevant market, the exis-
tence of a regulatory agency with an opinion that should be
considered, and how these two groups might view the transac-
tion.344 It was incompatible with the Internal Revenue Code be-
cause the relevant provision had exceptions, but these
transactions did not fall into one of them.3
45
Although the parties did not raise the economic substance
doctrine, the Court noted that the Sixth Circuit's opinion ana-
lyzed economic substance in depth.346 The Court further noted
that the IRS did not defend this aspect of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion and that the IRS's only comment on the Sixth Circuit's
opinion was in a footnote citing Higgins v. Smith, which the
Court distinguished.347
339. See generally Brief for the Respondent, Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499
U.S. 554 (1991) (No. 89-1965). It should be noted that the IRS argued that to be ma-
terially different, the loan portfolios had to differ in "economic substance." See Cot-
tage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991). This was not an invocation of
the economic substance doctrine because the IRS was not arguing that the transac-
tion lacked business purpose and economic substance and, therefore, should be de-
nied tax benefits. Rather, the IRS was arguing that the loan portfolios were
economic substitutes. See id. at 561-62.
340. See id. at 562.
341. Id. at 565.
342. See id. at 562-66.
343. See id. at 564-565.
344. See Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 565-66.
345. See id. at 566.
346. See id. at 568 (referencing an argument from Brief for United States at 16,
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (No. 89-1926)).
347. See id. at 568.
20031
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These cases show that the Supreme Court may approach an
examination of the standard substance-over-form doctrines from
a textualist perspective. Some questions remain, however. Did
Gregory announce one of those "long-standing and well-
accepted principles" the Supreme Court has developed "that [is]
effectively irreversible," such as the First Amendment principles
Justice Scalia described in his book?348 Or did Gregory set forth
one of those "binding abstractions" that "the highest court in the
judicial system may come to the conclusion that the result ines-
capably produced... is simply wrong?" 349 Perhaps Gregory
represents something in the middle in that it may limit courts to
determining what actually happened.350 This view seems like
the most appropriate use of Gregory, although the Supreme
Court would not need to rely on Gregory to announce such a
principle, as it utilizes common sense and proper textualist rea-
soning.
Another question to ponder is whether Gregory is another
Church of the Holy Trinity. The Court's approach in these cases
was almost identical. In both cases the Court justified its failure
to apply the statutory text in the name of congressional intent.
In Church of the Holy Trinity, the Court stated:
It must be conceded that the act of the [church] is within the
letter of this section .... It is a familiar rule that a thing may
be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the stat-
ute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of
its makers. 351
Similarly, in Gregory, Judge Hand wrote:
[I]t does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a
transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition ....
[Tlhe meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.352
As discussed above, Justice Scalia seems somewhat hostile to the
approach in Church of the Holy Trinity.353 "The defendant's act
348. See Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 138.
349. Scalia, Canards, supra note 29, at 589-90.
350. See Moore, supra note 4, at 678-79, 719 (suggesting that courts look at the
substance of a transaction, i.e., what actually happened, rather than attempting to
apply the sham transaction doctrine).
351. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892).
352. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), affid, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
353. See discussion supra Part lI.B.1.
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was within the letter of the statute, and therefore within the
statute: end of case." 354 Again, even throwing this aspect of
Gregory out, the Supreme Court could limit Gregory to the prin-
ciple that courts may examine what actually happened in a
transaction.
B. Legislative Branch-Development of the Code Since Gregory
The Internal Revenue Code has changed since Mrs. Gregory
created Averill to reduce her taxes. 355 In Gregory, the Board of
Tax Appeals reasoned that the Internal Revenue Code was so
detailed that Congress could not have intended judges to look
outside the statute to resolve an issue the text of the statute al-
ready resolved. 356 It stated: "A statute so meticulously drafted
must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy,
and leaves only the small interstices for judicial considera-
tion."357 The Internal Revenue Code was relatively simplistic
compared to today's Code. If Congress had not tried to restrain
judges at that point, it has likely done so now by narrowing the
interstices and including concepts of substance-over-form in the
text of the statute itself, making obsolete judicial variations of
substance-over-form.
Evidence that the interstices of the ]Internal Revenue Code
have gotten narrower can be found in the size of the tax laws.
Around the time of Mrs. Gregory's transaction, 1928, CCH's
Code and Regulations occupied a single volume of approxi-
mately 400 pages.358 Now CCH's soft-cover version is eight vol-
umes, spanning about 36,000 pages. 359 The increase in size
means, at least in part, increased specificity in the Code's provi-
sions. 360 Brockamp also confirmed that the Internal Revenue
Code sets forth many provisions in such a "highly detailed tech-
nical manner" so as to preclude interference from extratextual
doctrines.361
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code already gives au-
354. Scalia, Role of Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 20.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
356. See Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd sub norn. Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
357. Id. at 225-26.
358. Pollack, supra note 130, at 320 n.3 (noting that the CCH volume did not ex-
pand beyond a little over 400 pages until World War II).
359. Id.
360. CCH's current volumes also contain text of repealed sections.
361. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997).
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thority to the IRS to override the technical results from the ap-
plication of Code provisions. Some of these provisions are the
following:
1. Section 269-Allows the IRS to deny tax benefits where a
taxpayer acquires control or property in a corporation in
certain instances where the acquisition has a tax avoid-
ance motive362
2. Section 446-Allows the IRS to change a taxpayer's
method of accounting to clearly reflect its income 363
3. Section 482-Allows the IRS to allocate income and de-
ductions between controlled corporations to properly re-
flect income or prevent tax evasion364
4. Section 845- Allows the IRS to allocate, recharacterize, or
make other adjustments to tax items related reinsurance
agreements to properly reflect income 365
5. Section 7701(l)-Authorizes the IRS to develop regula-
tions to tax cross-border financing arrangements; the IRS
exercised this authority when it adopted Treas. Reg.
1.881-3366
Further, it is possible that Congress has attempted to pre-
clude the override of the text of any Code provision with judicial
substance-over-form doctrines. Congress has incorporated sub-
stance-over-form principles into various provisions throughout
the Code, similar to the judicial requirement in lower courts of
business purpose or economic substance. The requirement in §
269 above, that certain transactions lack a tax avoidance motive,
is very similar to a business purpose requirement. 367 Section 183
requires that a taxpayer have a profit motive to obtain certain tax
benefits.368 Section 707 requires that certain transactions be-
tween certain related partnerships have a substantial economic
effect.369 Reading the Internal Revenue Code to include princi-
ples that override the text make the above code provisions point-
less. 370
362. See 26 U.S.C. § 269 (2002).
363. See id. § 446.
364. See id. § 482.
365. See id. § 845.
366. See id. § 7701(1).
367. See id. § 269.
368. See 26 U.S.C. § 183 (2002).
369. See 26 U.S.C. § 707 (2002).
370. As Justice Scalia stated in Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
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Many Code provisions already have explicit "facts and cir-
cumstances" tests.371 Thus there is no need for an additional
"facts and circumstances" test, which essentially is what the
substance-over-form doctrines represent. In addition, many leg-
islative Treasury regulations incorporate substance-over-form
principles. The new regulations governing spin-offs under §
355(e) provide for step transaction tests to determine whether a
taxpayer is entitled to certain tax benefits.372 Also, the regula-
tions governing partnership transactions subject such transac-
tions to business purpose373  and substance-over-form
principles.374
Congress knows how to tax what it wants to tax. A number
of the cases discussed in this article involve a transaction that the
Code did not explicitly tax or deny tax benefits to at the time of
the transaction. However, by the time those cases reached the
courts, Congress had already found a way to tax the transac-
tions.375 For example, Congress reacted to the real estate tax
shelter boom in the 1980s with passive activity loss rules.376
C. Executive Branch-Recent Actions by the Treasury and IRS
The IRS and the U.S. Treasury Department have given the
Supreme Court reason to disregard the standard substance-over-
form doctrines. Until recently, the IRS tried to handle a per-
ceived corporate tax shelter problem on its own rather than ask-
ing Congress for guidance.377 The IRS succeeded in invoking
various substance-over-form doctrines in numerous cases in Tax
Court involving so called "tax shelters."378 The Treasury and the
senting): "[T]he fundamental judicial function of reading the body of enacted laws
in such fashion [is] to cause none of them to be pointless; and [failure] to achieve
that [is] sure to engender confusion and litigation." Id. at 15.
371. See 26 U.S.C. § 280A(d)(2)(C) (2002); 26 U.S.C. § 357(d)(1)(a) (2002); 26
U.S.C. § 704(b) (2002).
372. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7T(h)(1)(i) (2002).
373. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1) (2002).
374. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(2) (2002).
375. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362 (1960); Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001); Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
376. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REv. 819, 839 (1991); see also Esmark v.
Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171, 200 (1988), affd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that
Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), was resolved by statute).
377. See B. John Williams, Remarks at Federal Bar Tax Law Conference (Mar. 11,
2002) (reported by Sheryl Stratton, 2002 TNT 48-4).
378. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 20 (1999), rev'd,
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IRS pursued this avenue of regulation through litigation despite
the Treasury's admission that the "[a]pplication of these doc-
trines to a particular set of facts is uncertain." 379 The Treasury
testified before Congress that there was a problem more impor-
tant than revenue loss from "tax shelters": public relations.380
The Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy to the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury testified that public relations are a bigger
problem than the "revenue loss" from "tax shelters."
There is some question as to whether there really is a "tax
shelter" problem. Commentators and the government have said
that tax shelters have led to revenue loss. 381 This statement,
however, presupposes a clear definition of "tax shelter." There
isn't one.382 Maybe it is fair to say that tax fraud has led to reve-
nue loss because it is clear in the case of fraud that the income at
issue was meant to be taxed. If the term "tax shelter" includes a
transaction that technically meets the standards in the Code but
the IRS nevertheless denies a tax benefit, this definition actually
provides a tax windfall to the government, not a would-have-
been revenue loss.
In addition, the term "revenue loss" assumes that corporate
taxpayers already operate on a tax efficient basis. However, the
General Accounting Office estimated that in 1998 individual
277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684 (1999),
vacated, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C.
254 (1999), affd, 254 F.3d 1.313 (11th Cir. 2001); ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r,.
76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), affd, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); ACM P'ship v.
Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), affd, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
379. TAX SHELTER WHITE PAPER, supra note 133, at 46.
380. See Corporate Tax Shelters: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
106th Cong. 25 (1999) (statement of Jonathan Talisman, Acting Assistant Sec'y for
Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury). Jonathan Talisman stated:
[T]he corrosive effect of tax shelters breeds disrespect for the tax system,
encouraging responsible corporate taxpayers to expect this type of activity
to be the norm and to follow the lead of other taxpayers who have en-
gaged in tax advantaged transactions. This race to the bottom, if unabated,
will have long-term consequences to voluntary compliance, far more im-
portant than the short-term revenue loss we are currently experiencing.
Id.
381. See TAX SHELTER WHITE PAPER, supra note 133, at 3; Joseph Bankman, The
Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000).
382. See TAX SHELTER WHITE PAPER, supra note 133, at v ("Because corporate tax
shelters take many different forms and utilize many different structures, they are
difficult to define with a single formulation."). The Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides multiple definitions of a tax shelter. See 26 U.S.C. § 448(d)(3) (2002); 26 U.S.C.
§ 6111(c) (2002); 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (2002).
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taxpayers overpaid by $945 million.383 This estimate resulted
from an estimate of the number of taxpayers that elected not to
itemize their deductions. 384 Corporate taxpayers may also over-
pay their taxes.
The new Chief Counsel of the IRS also has committed to re-
lying less on litigation to advance tax policies:
I firmly believe that litigation should never be the means to
advance policy choices. The public is entitled to know and
rely on the law and the agency's interpretations before cases
are developed. Counsel must make a renewed effort to de-
velop those interpretations through public guidance. 385
He has also stated that the IRS will stop using the economic sub-
stance doctrine as a "silver bullet." 386
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court's recent trend of resolving tax
cases using textualist interpretation methods, it is doubtful that
the Court would allow the standard sham transaction doctrine,
the business purpose doctrine, the economic substance doctrine,
or the step-transaction doctrine to stand. Moreover, courts and
the IRS have precise texts to which they can refer. The precision
of these texts leave little room for the interference of vague, in-
determinate judicial doctrines in an area of law where certainty
and predictability are crucial. Although it would seem that the
IRS should have a way to challenge a transaction it believes
Congress meant to tax, the substance-over-form doctrines are
not the way to do it. It appears that the IRS and the Treasury
Department now recognize this fact, because they have been
sprinkling their regulations with tidbits of economic and intent
requirements where they deem appropriate. Congress appears
to recognize it as well, as evidenced by the fact that it has en-
acted transparency laws that allow it to react faster with legisla-
tion when it decides it should be taxing certain transactions. 387
The transparency laws provide an excellent solution to the po-
383. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. 02-509, TAX DEDUCTIONS:
FURTHER ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAY HAVE OVERPAID FEDERAL TAXES BY
NOT ITEMIZING 2-3 (2002).
384. See id.
385. Pending Nominations: Hearing Before Comm on Fin., 107th Cong. 9 (2001)
(statement of B. John Williams, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service).
386. See Williams, supra note 377.
387. See I.R.C. §§ 6707-6714 (2002).
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tential theoretical problem under Godel's Incompleteness Theo-
rem 388 because they provide feedback to the proper lawmakers.
This article does not suggest that courts should not examine
whether a transaction authorized by the Code actually occurred.
In other words, if the Code authorizes a taxpayer to take deduc-
tions on interest on indebtedness paid for a principal residence,
it would make sense to see if the taxpayer actually owns the
principal residence and actually borrowed money to pay for it.
As Professor Joseph Isenbergh says, otherwise it would be like
"someone call[ing] a dog a cow and then seek[ing] a subsidy
provided by statute for cows." 389 But this is not what these sub-
stance-over-form doctrines do. Instead, they override the text of
the Internal Revenue Code.390
If the Supreme Court were to overturn the sham transaction
doctrine, the business purpose doctrine, the economic substance
doctrine, or the step-transaction doctrine, that decision would
further the goals of textualism. It would minimize reliance on a
slow developing "facts and circumstances" common-law ap-
proach. Further, it would import more certainty into our tax
laws. Finally, it would empower the trial and appellate courts to
stand up against the popular will of demonizing corporate
America. If the Supreme Court hears a case while the recent
trend in textualism continues, the tension between textualism
and substance-over-form will probably be resolved in favor of
textualism. Thus, it makes sense for the clear text of the Code to
control tax cases.
388. See supra text accompanying note 298.
389. Isenbergh, supra note 131, at 865.
390. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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